Lesley Birsa nka Faulds v. Dennis Carl Birsa : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
Lesley Birsa nka Faulds v. Dennis Carl Birsa : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David S. Dolowitz; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal.
Kellie F. Williams; Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Birsa v. Birsa, No. 20000177 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2660
IN Mil i ' I Ml ( o : ' I - n i l MMM \l 
LESLL\ BIRSA, nkaFAU D \ 
Petitionci >p|,c:ic-
vs. 
DENNIS CAR! BIRSA, ,\o. z000< 
Respondent/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
/ -r*. \i s vl ihi iUDGMEM OF THE 1 Hlki • JI DICIAL DISTRICT CO! R 
!\ \ND FOR SUMMIT COl MY. > I A f L OF UTAH. 
HONORABLE PAT B BRI-W PRESIDING 
\ !DS Dvn .)WTTZ 
( ()HNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGA! p C 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O.Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
KF1 i IFF. WILLIAMS, #3493 
• •). PORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
e\ for Petitioner/Appellee 
808 East South T e m P H F | L E D 
Salt Lake CitvUT 84 jrtofAopMte 
JUL 1 2 2000 
Jute D'Aleeandro 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LESLEY BIRSA, nka FAULDS, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
DENNIS CARL BIRSA, Case No. 20000177CA 
: Priority #15 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN, PRESIDING 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O.Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS, #3493 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC. 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, 
AND RULES, ETC 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
A. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 2 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 2 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 12 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DENIED FATHER'S REQUEST TO 
RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM RELOCATING TO NEVADA 12 
I. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
FATHER'S REQUEST TO RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM RELOCATING TO 
NEVADA 12 
A. FATHER'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 12 
B. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING FATHER'S REQUEST TO RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM 
RELOCATING TO NEVADA 15 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT DID NOT HAVE 
i 
THE POWER TO PREVENT RELOCATION OR MODIFY CUSTODY UNDER 
THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 24 
CONCLUSION 28 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 30 
i i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Cases 
Bailey-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P 2d 180 (Utah. App. 1997) 12 
Crouse v Crouse. 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 199n 1 
Cummingsv Cummings. 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991) 20 
Hirsch v. Hirsch. 725 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1986) 20 
Hoggev Hogge. 649 P 2d 51 (Utah 1982) 18, 20,25 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982) 20 
In re Application of Conde. 347 P.2d 859 (Utah 1959) 20 
In re Cooper. 410 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1966) 20 
Larson v Larson. 888 P 2d 719 (Utah App 1994) 1,2, 19-21,24 
Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990) 20 
Myers v Mvers. 768 P 2d 979 (Utah App 1989) 14-18,21,24 
Nielsen v. Nielsen. 620 P.2d 511 (Utah 1980) 20 
Pukey v. Pukey. 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) 14 
Rosendahl v. Rosendahl. 876 P.2d 870 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1994) 20 
Salt Lake City v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah App. 1997) 1 
Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) 27,28 
State v. Skickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) 14 
i i i 
Other State Cases 
In Re: Marriage of Burgess. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996) 20,21 
Jaramillo v. Jaramillo. 823 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991) 26,27 
Wattv. Watt. 971 P.2d 608 (Wy. Sup. Ct. 1999) 27,28 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 25 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10 24,25 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.4 24 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(h) 1 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 1 
Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 28 
Articles of Confederation, Art. IV, §1 (1777) 27 
Articles 
Relocation Standards and Constitutional Considerations. Journal of the American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Vol. 15, pgs. 229, 237, 1998, Comment 18 
A Children's Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best Interests Standard 
Gary A. Debele, Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Vol. 15, 
1998, pp. 75-118 21,22 
The Psychological Effects of Relocation for Children of Divorce. Marion G. Gindes, Ph. 
D, Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Vol. 15, 1998, 
pp. 119-148) 23 
i v 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(h), and the provisions of Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Whether the trial court correctly allowed Appellee (hereinafter "Mother") to 
relocate to Nevada with her children when Mother had physical custody of the children 
and the Appellant (hereinafter "Father") has not sought to change this custodial 
arrangement. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of law and constitutionality are reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake 
City v. Lopez. 935 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
If this Court determines that the action at the lower court amounts to a petition to 
modify custody on behalf of the Father, the trial court's decision to maintain the custodial 
relationship with the Mother will be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 
Larson v. Larson. 888 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Crouse v. Crouse. 817 
P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991)). In Larson this Court clarified the standard required to 
change custody on the basis of a relocation by stating that "unless there were compelling 
evidence that residing in Summit County, Utah, would be better for the children than 
allowing them to continue to reside with their life-long primary caregiver [the relocating 
parent], we would conclude that the trial court exceeded the exercise of sound discretion 
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in entering the order before us." LdL at 723 (reversing the trial court's order changing the 
custodial relationship if the primary caregiver relocated out of Summit County). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no statutes or provisions which are wholly dispositive of the issues 
presented in this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Summit County, State of Utah. In particular, Father has appealed the lower court's order 
denying Father's request that Mother be restrained from relocating to Nevada. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This matter came before the lower on Mother's Verified Motion for Approval to 
Relocate which was filed on or about October 11, 1999. Father then filed a Motion on 
Temporary Issues on or about November 10, 1999, in part requesting that Mother's 
request to relocate be denied. Both parties filed supporting pleadings and documentation 
and the matter originally came before the lower court on November 17, 1999. 
At this hearing, the lower court stated that Mother's relocation was appropriate 
and should be permitted during the 1999/2000 Christmas Holiday. In addition, the lower 
court granted Father's request that the matter be reviewed by the custody evaluator, and 
that the matter be set for further hearing. 
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The matter came on for further hearing on December 22, 1999, and upon hearing 
arguments and proffers of counsel, the lower court granted Mother's request to relocate to 
Las Vegas with the children, and, specifically, ordered that the relocation take place on or 
after July 1, 2000, to allow the children to complete their school year, to facilitate 
therapy, and allow Father to improve his relationship with Sebastian. 
Father filed his Notice of Appeal of this Order on or about February 18, 2000. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were divorced by a Decree of Divorce dated February 18, 1997. (R. 
1910-1920). The Decree stemmed from a trial setting on January 27, 1997. (R. 1910). 
At that time, the parties, with the encouragement of Judge Pat B. Brian, negotiated a 
settlement of the issues attendant to the marital estate and custody of their children. (R. 
1910-1920). The settlement was reached over many hours with the input and 
recommendations of Judge Brian. (R. 1910-1920). 
The parties have two children, Kelsey, whose date of birth is January 22, 1987, 
and who is now 13 years of age, and Sebastian, whose date of birth is October 23, 1984, 
and who is 15 years of age. (R. 2). The parties had previously separated in January of 
1995 and, originally, the Mother had custody of both children on a temporary basis. (R. 
2274). The Decree, however, awarded physical custody of Kelsey to Mother and 
physical custody of Sebastian to Father and joint legal custody to both parents. (R. 1910-
1920). 
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At the time of the settlement, Mother expressed to the court and Father her desire 
to move from the Salt Lake area and return to Nevada. (R. 2274). Father expressed his 
desire that this not occur. (R. 2274). After substantial discussion with the lower court, 
the court suggested what was thought to be a reasonable resolution and that became the 
stipulation and order of the court. (R. 1910-1920). That language is contained in 
paragraph 5 of the Decree and that language is as follows: 
"Both plaintiff and defendant are enjoined from moving out of the Salt Lake 
County, Utah or Summit County, Utah for the next sixteen (16) months in 
order to facilitate a continuation of visitation as hereinafter set out. Should 
either party desire to move from the designated geographical area after 
sixteen (16) months, the party desiring to move shall file a motion and place 
it on the court's law and motion calendar, requesting that the move be 
approved by the court and specifying the reasons why the party desires to 
make the move. If the request is opposed by the other party, the court will 
hear the motion. The court has indicated it will be inclined to grant the 
motion if there is any good reason for the move. At the time of hearing, the 
court shall determine whether to grant the move or whether any further 
evaluation or information is needed. In order to implement this provision, 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian shall retain jurisdiction over the case as to any 
motion involving a requested move." (R. 1911) (emphasis added). 
During a substantial portion of the parties' marriage and relationship, they resided 
in Las Vegas, Nevada, and, indeed, at the date of divorce the parties still owned a 
residence together in Las Vegas. (R. 2275). The Father currently owns a business and 
real estate in Las Vegas. (R. 2275). Mother owns real estate in Las Vegas. (R. 2275). 
Mother's family continues to reside in Las Vegas, though Mother's father recently passed 
away. (R. 2275). 
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Mother filed a Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce on or about 
September 1, 1999, within which petition she requested physical custody of Sebastian. 
(R. 2099-2104). Sebastian had been residing in Mother's home since, approximately, 
August 23, 1999. (R. 2100). The move to Mother's home occurred after an altercation 
between Father and Sebastian as a result of which Father kicked Sebastian down a set of 
stairs and continued to kick him the buttocks and stomach until he kicked him out of the 
house. (R. 2276, Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). There were bruises on the 
child and an 8 centimeter skin abrasion on his right knee and photographs were taken by 
DCFS. (R. 2276). Mother was advised by the DCFS worker at that time that there 
should be no visitation between Father and Sebastian. (R. 2276). Sebastian has shown 
no interest in visiting with his Father, and is not visiting with his Father. (R. 2276). 
Mother has acknowledged that Sebastian requires substantial time commitment 
and supervision. (R. 2276). Sebastian has been volatile and has acted out physically. (R. 
2276). Mother has refused to engage the child physically. (R. 2276). Unfortunately, 
Father has historically disciplined the child by physically grabbing his hair and neck and 
throwing him against the walls and onto the ground. (R. 2276, Update Evaluation, Aplt. 
Apndx. pg. 4). Sebastian's earlier residence with Father was due to the need to keep the 
children separate because of an abuse incident between the children, Sebastian and 
Kelsey, approximately three and one-half years ago. (R. 2276). Since that time, both 
children have matured, and Sebastian, who has been under the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court, has received treatment for his behavioral problems and Mother has taken 
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appropriate steps to provide appropriate structure for Sebastian and appropriate structure 
and protection for Kelsey. (R. 2276-2277). The children's relationship is very good and 
the relationship continues to be consistently monitored by Mother. (R. 2277). It is 
important to note that Mother will have extended family available in Las Vegas to assist 
her in this supervision. (R. 2277, Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). There is no 
extended family on either side in Salt Lake City. (R. 2277, R. 2270 Transcript pg. 8-9). 
Mother filed a Verified Motion for Approval to Relocate on or about October 12, 
1999. (R. 2107-2123). Mother set forth in that motion that she desired to move to Las 
Vegas because she had lived there for 18 years and for the reasons that her parents, two 
sisters, brother-in-law and nephew resided in Las Vegas. (R. 2108-2109, Update 
Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). Her father has since passed away but was also Mother's 
intention to reside close to her mother and sister. (R. 2108). Within the motion, Mother 
also indicated that she could receive a higher paying salary in Las Vegas. (R. 2109). She 
had also commenced a business in Las Vegas with her sister, Sonja, which involves real 
estate investment and sale. (R. 2109, Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 4). This 
business can be performed substantially at home to allow greater flexibility of lime with 
the children. (R. 2277). Indeed, subsequent to the lower court's orders in regard to the 
relocation having been entered, Mother terminated her employment in as a nurse 
anticipation of new employment in Las Vegas, sold her residence, and moved to Las 
Vegas. (R. 2277-2278). 
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Father continues to operate his business, CB Display as a business in Las Vegas, 
and owns real property in Las Vegas. (R. 2278). The proximity of Las Vegas to Salt 
Lake is reasonable. The flight time is, approximately, 1 hour. (R. 2278, R. 2270 
Transcript pg. 14). Further, Father's income is substantial as he had earned $16,250.00 
per month at the time of the Decree. (R. 2132). This makes ease of travel somewhat less 
onerous. 
Father has historically not exercised mid-week or "surprise visits" with the 
children and the parties have resided some distance from one another for several years. 
Mother has resided in Holladay and Father in Woodland, Utah. (R. 2278, R. 2270 
Transcript pg. 14, lines 9-17). On this issue, the evidence before the trial court was that 
"[t]here is no spontaneity of contact. . . Mr. Birsa has not taken the opportunities, 
although offered, to pick up the children for lunch or to pick up the children and take 
them to gymnastics or do any of those things that he could. He's simply not done it. 
He's done the standard visitation. That's all he's done." (R. 2270 Transcript pg. 14, 
lines 9-17). There have not been "spontaneous" visits by Father with Kelsey and there 
are currently no visits occurring between Sebastian and Father. (R. 2278). 
Sebastian has not been thriving in his educational process and so a change or move 
from one school to another is likely to not have substantial impact. (R. 2278, R. 2270 
Transcript pg. 30-31). Also, Kelsey has had to change schools, in any event, after the 
end of the 1999/2000 school year, due to the fact that her junior high closed at the end of 
this school year and the children were divided between other schools. (R. 2278, R. 2270 
7 
Transcript pg. 11). Therefore, she was faced with the disruption of a change in school 
and classmates in any event. (R. 2278). The lower court carefully weighed the effects of 
the relocation on the best interests of the children and the timing of such a relocation and 
specifically stated that the July 1 move "would give the children the summer to make 
some friends, find out where the school is, do what needs to be done for another move in 
their lives. It may provide some meaningful help to this very troubled 15-year-old-boy." 
(R. 2270 Transcript pg. 39). The trial court also reiterated Jill Sanders reasoning why the 
relocation should take place on July 1, stating that "I believe that she's right on." (R. 
2270 Transcript pg. 39). 
Both children very much want to reside with Mother. (R. 2279, Update 
Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 3). Kelsey has resided in Mother's custody since the 
parties' separation. (R. 2270 Transcript pg. 16, 18). Father has offered to take back 
custody of Sebastian, but he has indicated twice in open court that if he does, the child 
will not live with him and suggested that the child would be placed in a military school in 
Colorado. (R. 2279, R. 2270 Transcript pg. 14, 31). This is an even greater distance 
from Woodland, Utah and makes for even greater difficulty in repairing the damage 
between Sebastian and Father than the child's residence in Las Vegas with Mother and 
sister. (R. 2279). Both children are comfortable with and supportive of the move. (R. 
2279, Custody Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 3). 
Mother's motion for approval to relocate initially came on for hearing on 
November 17, 1999 before Judge Brian. (R. 2215). At that time, after argument, the 
8 
lower court issued an order indicating its intention that Mother be permitted to move at 
the Christmas holidays, but that Father could have the matter reviewed by Dr. Jill 
Sanders, the custody evaluator, and that upon the receipt of that report, the court would 
address the issue further. (R. 2240-2243). 
Dr. Sanders was the original custody evaluator. (R. 2279). She met with the 
children and the parties and issued her recommendations. (R. 2279). Her primary 
recommendation was that Mother not be permitted to relocate. (Update Evaluation, Aplt. 
Apndx. pg. 4). Counsel for Mother had previously informed the lower court at the date 
of the hearing on November 17, 1999 that it was counsel's belief that Dr. Sanders would, 
indeed, recommend that the move not occur. (R. 2279-2280). Dr. Sanders is typically 
opposed to custodial parents relocating and has openly expressed this opinion in this case, 
other cases, and in seminars; including one very recent seminar hosted by counsel for 
Father.1 (R. 2280). Dr. Sanders recommended, however, that if the lower court did 
allow Mother to relocate that it should occur at the end of the current school year. 
(Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx. pg. 5). Dr. Sanders did not recommend that Father be 
awarded custody of either child. (Update Evaluation, Aplt. Apndx.). Dr. Sanders did not 
recommend that Sebastian be sent to military school in Colorado. (Update Evaluation, 
Aplt. Apndx.). No petition is pending requesting custody of the children by Respondent. 
1
 E>r. Sanders spoke December 4, 1999 in Salt Lake City a seminar sponsored by the 
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and hosted by Mr. Dolowitz at which time she 
opined she was generally not in favor of relocation for custodial parents. 
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After receipt of Dr. Sanders' report, this matter was heard by Judge Brian on 
December 22, 1999 and at that time the lower court heard the proffers and arguments of 
counsel and reviewed the law and entered an order. (R. 2244, R. 2250-2252, Transcript 
at R. 2270). The lower court specifically ordered that the Mother's motion to relocate be 
granted, but that it should take place July 1 or later to allow for completion of the school 
year, therapeutic treatment of Sebastian and the healing process between Father and 
Sebastian. (R. 2250-2251). Sebastian has been in therapy with Barbara Dobbs. (R. 
2280). There continues to be no visitation being exercised between Father and Sebastian, 
though the child was asked by Father to accompany him on a two week European 
vacation in June. (R. 2280). 
Father previously filed a motion to prevent the relocation and for a stay of the trial 
court's order which proceeded to hearing on April 21, 2000 before the Honorable Robert 
Hilder. (R. 2263-2265). Judge Hilder denied the motion. (Minute Entry dated 
4/21/2000, Volume 6 of Record, not numbered). Father filed a motion with this Court to 
prevent relocation and for a stay of the lower court's order and this motion was argued 
and denied on May 17, 2000. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The lower court's denial of the Father's request to restrain the Mother from 
relocating to Nevada was appropriate in this action. The Father has not petitioned for a 
change of custody. The Father did not request custody at the lower level and did not 
offer any evidence as to whether a change in custody would be in the children's best 
10 
interests. The decree of divorce contemplated a relocation and the lower court 
established how and when such a relocation could occur. The Mother complied with 
these requirements. The updated evaluation, while primarily recommending against 
relocation, also clearly established that it would be against the best interests of the 
children to disrupt the custodial relationship between Mother and the children. 
In this case, the Father, while failing to request a change in custody, also failed to 
establish any of the necessary legal requirements to even allow the lower court to 
consider such a change in custody. To be able to modify a physical custodial 
relationship, the lower court must establish that since the time of the previous decree, 
circumstances upon the which the earlier award was based have changed; and these 
changed circumstances are sufficiently substantial and material to justify reopening the 
question of custody. Only after such a finding, the lower court must then determine that 
the change in custody is in the children's best interests. These required findings were 
neither made by the lower court, nor were they supported by any of the evidence. This 
being the case, the lower court correctly maintained the custodial relationship. 
Furthermore, if Father's argument is interpreted to state that, the trial court could 
modify the previous order to restrain Mother from ever relocating as long as the children 
were minors, such a determination would violate a number of Mother's constitutional 
rights under both the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States of 
America. In effect, Father would be requesting that this Court simply change physical 
custody based only on the Mother's relocation and thereby ignore the children's best 
11 
interests all together or unilaterally restrain Mother and the children from ever relocating 
in violation of their constitutional rights to travel and associate. 
ARGUMENT 
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DENIED FATHER'S REQUEST TO 
RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM RELOCATING TO NEVADA. 
I. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING FATHER'S REQUEST TO RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM 
RELOCATING TO NEVADA. 
A. FATHER'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE. 
Father acknowledges that "[w]hen attacking the exercise of discretion by a trial 
court, it is the responsibility of Appellant to search the record and marshal the evidence 
that supports the decision of the trial court." (Aplt. Brf. pg 15); See Bailey-Allen Co.. 
Inc. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah. App. 1/97) (holding that an appellant must first 
marshall all of the evidence supporting the lower court's findings, and then demonstrate 
that, even if viewed in a light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the findings). Rather than following this rule, Father simply states 
that "[i]n this case, there is none. The only evidence of the best interests of the children 
that has been presented to the trial court is the bare assertion to that effect in the motion 
of the Appellee." (Aplt. Brf. pg. 15). 
However, the lower court clearly stated in its order that it based it's order on the 
entire file, pleadings, Dr. Sanders report, the arguments and proffers of counsel. Some of 
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the facts which should have been marshaled by Father which were included as the basis 
for the lower court's order include: 
1. Mother had physical custody of both of the children. Father has not 
requested physical custody of the children. In fact, Father has stated at least twice in 
open court that if he had physical custody of Sebastian, he would send him to military 
school in Colorado. 
2. As found by Dr. Sanders, both children "have expressed a desire to 
continue their primary residence with [Mother]". Dr. Sanders also found this to be 
"logical outcome" for Kelsey based upon her historical custodial relationship with 
Mother, Kelsey's "strong attachment to her mother," and gender and developmental 
issues. 
3. As found by Dr. Sanders, Father voluntarily relinquished physical custody 
of Sebastian to Mother in August of 1999. Sebastian has refused to participate in 
visitation with Father. As found by Dr. Sanders, this rift was a result of physical abuse to 
Sebastian by Father. 
4. As found by Dr. Sanders and stated by Mother, Mother's desire to relocate 
was based upon many reasons including a desire to live closer to her extended family in 
Nevada, including her recently widowed mother. Neither party has extended family in 
Utah. Such access to extended family will be a positive influence for the children. In 
addition, Mother has embarked on a real estate venture in Las Vegas which has become 
difficult to manage from Utah and requires her ongoing attention. By improving her 
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business and finances, Mother will be more able to provide emotional and financial 
support for the children. 
5. Although Dr. Sanders did recommend that her first choice was that Mother 
not be allowed to relocate, Dr. Sanders then spent over one quarter of her report 
recommending the timing and possible visitation once the relocation is granted. Dr. 
Sanders did not recommend that Father be awarded custody. This clearly evidences Dr. 
Sanders' acknowledgment that the custodial relationship between Mother and the 
children should not be disrupted regardless of the relocation. 
Dr. Sanders clearly did not address the legal issues attendant to this case, and 
based her report solely on interviews with the parties, the children, and her personal 
opinions and biases. "[T]he trial court is free to accept or reject an expert's testimony, 
and may accord it whatever weight it deems appropriate in light of all the other evidence 
in the case." Myers v. Myers. 768 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. 
Skickles. 760 P.2d 291, 302 (Utah 1988); Pukey v. Pukey. 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
1986)). Based upon all of the information available to the lower court and the lower 
court's familiarity with the parties and the case in general and the legal issues, the lower 
court did not abuse its discretion in providing different weight to the different 
recommendations of Dr. Sander's report. 
None of these facts which provided the basis of the lower court's order were 
marshaled by Father. When these facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the lower 
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court, it is obvious that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's 
request to restrain Mother from relocating to Nevada. 
B. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING FATHER'S REQUEST TO RESTRAIN MOTHER FROM 
RELOCATING TO NEVADA. 
Father relies on this Court's decisions in Myers v. Myers and Larson v. Larson to 
support his contention that even in light of all of the evidence supporting Mother's 
relocation with the children, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Father's 
request to restrain Mother from relocating. Father states that "[i]n Myers, this court 
determined that the trial court must have found that it was in the children's best interest to 
relocate." (Aplt. Brf. pg. 15). However, in Myers, the trial court allowed a relocation of 
a custodial parent, even though the trial court did not specifically find that the relocation 
was in the children's best interests, and this Court affirmed. 768 P.2d 979, 983-84 (Utah 
App. 1989). 
In Myers, the trial court did find that the relocating parent was the primary care 
giver, she had remarried and appropriately filed a motion to relocate based upon her 
husband's employment, that the custody evaluator supported continuing the custodial 
relationship based upon the non-custodial parent's conduct, the trauma involved in 
changing custody, and the bond between the custodial parent and the children. Id. 
Although the trial court did not specifically find the relocation to be in the children's best 
interest, this Court stated that "it is reasonable to infer that the court's determination of 
the children's best interests included consideration of this move." 14. at 984. 
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In the Myers case, the non-custodial parent had petitioned to modify the 
custodial arrangement and was seeking physical custody of the children. In addition, in 
Myers, the decree awarded custody to the mother, so long as remained in or within fifty 
miles of Salt Lake County. In the present case, Father has not requested physical custody 
of the children. Dr. Sanders never recommended any change in custody, and in fact 
specifically stated her recommendations for the timing of the relocation and the specifics 
of visitation after the relocation. It is also interesting to note that Dr. Sanders also opined 
that if the lower court pennitted the move, then Mother should be responsible for any and 
all costs of transportation for visitation. (See Aplt. Apndx. Second Update pg. 6). 
Further, in this case, unlike Myers, at the time of the decree, the issue of relocation 
was specifically addressed. This decree specifically addressed the issue of relocation as 
follows: 
"Both plaintiff and defendant are enjoined from moving out of the Salt Lake 
County, Utah or Summit County, Utah for the next sixteen (16) months in 
order to facilitate a continuation of visitation as hereinafter set out. Should 
either party desire to move from the designated geographical area after 
sixteen (16) months, the party desiring to move shall file a motion and place 
it on the court's law and motion calendar, requesting that the move be 
approved by the court and specifying the reasons why the party desires to 
make the move. If the request is opposed by the other party, the court will 
hear the motion. The court has indicated it will be inclined to grant the 
motion if there is any good reason for the move. At the time of hearing, the 
court shall determine whether to grant the move or whether any further 
evaluation or information is needed. In order to implement this provision, 
the Honorable Pat B. Brian shall retain jurisdiction over the case as to any 
motion involving a requested move." (emphasis added). 
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Each of the conditions precedent in the decree took place in this matter. The initial 
sixteen months had passed, a motion for relocation was filed, and a further evaluation 
was performed. 
As in Myers, in the present case, the relocating parent, Mother, is the physical 
custodial parent. Her motion to relocate was based upon her desire to facilitate her 
business opportunities, and to be close to her recently widowed mother and other 
extended family. The lower court relied on Dr. Sander's report, as well as all of the other 
evidence showing the strength of the bond between the children and Mother, the physical 
abuse of Sebastian by Father, and the importance of maintaining the custodial 
relationship between the children and Mother. From all of this evidence, and in light of 
the differences between Myers and the present case (Father has not requested custody and 
the decree favorably addressed the issue of relocation), even where the lower court did 
not specifically state that the relocation was in the children's best interest, it is reasonable 
to infer that the court's determination of the children's best interests included 
consideration of this move. 
The lower court was aware that Mother intended to move, she had sold her 
residence in Utah, quit her employment, and her business interests in Nevada required a 
greater physical presence in Nevada. Father acknowledges in his Brief (pg. 16) that 
Mother has a constitutional right to travel2 (addressed further below) and that "the court 
2
 Along with constitutional rights to personhood, privacy, autonomy, home and 
community, right to association that includes family and marriage. See Relocation Standards 
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has the power to say she may [relocate] but the children may not be relocated as that is 
contrary to their best interests."3 This argument, however, is illogical as it would require 
that Father be awarded physical custody, or that the State of Utah be awarded 
guardianship. In light of all of the unrebutted evidence from the pleadings and Dr. 
Sanders' report, it is clear that the children's best interests were best served by 
maintaining the custodial relationship with Mother, rather than putting them in foster care 
in Utah or awarding Father physical custody which would disrupt the custodial 
relationship with Mother and the children which is contrary to the children's wishes and 
Dr. Sanders' evaluation. A change in custody would also force Sebastian to live with his 
Father who has undisputedly physically abused him at least twice, and allow Father to 
unilaterally move Sebastian out to Colorado to military school regardless of the child's 
best interests. 
and Constitutional Considerations. Journal of the American Academy of Matrimonial 
Lawyers, Vol. 15, 229, 237, 1998, Comment. 
3This argument that the lower court can simply change custody if Mother chooses to 
relocate is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Hogge v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51 
(Utah 1982) which established the two-step test to determine whether or not a change in 
custody is warranted prior to determining the question of what is in the children's best 
interests. Hogge holds that prior to a determination of best interests, the lower court must 
establish that" (1) since the time of the previous decree, circumstances upon the which the 
earlier award was based have changed; and (2) these changed circumstances are sufficiently 
substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody." Id, at 54. Only after 
such a finding, the lower court must then determine that the change in custody is in the 
children's best interests, again a finding which the lower court and Dr. Sanders did not make. 
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As with the case of Myers, in Larson, the non-custodial parent petitioned to 
modify the physical custody order. 888 P.2d 719 (Utah App. 1994). This petition was 
premised by the custodial parent's intention to move to Oregon to live with her fiance. 
WL at 721. The non-custodial parent stated that the relocation would interfere with his 
relationship with the children, disrupt their religious training, and remove them from their 
friends and relatives. Id The trial court did not award custody to the non-custodial 
parent, but ordered that if the custodial parent moved from Summit County, physical 
custody would be transferred as it was in the children's best interests to remain in the 
Park City area. IdL 
On appeal, this Court determined that the lower court's order could only be 
interpreted as meaning that "the children's domicile in Summit County is so essential to 
their well-being that removal from that community would be more detrimental to them 
than separating them from their custodial parent- the person who has been primarily 
responsible for their day-to-day care for the entirety of their lives." Id at 722. This 
Court went on to state that "[w]hile such a conclusion is not inherently impossible, a 
factor of considerable importance in determining the best interest of children is the 
maintenance of continuity in their lives, and removing children from their existing 
custodial placement undercuts that policy." 14. at 722-23 (citations omitted). This Court 
determined that the lower court erred in modifying the custodial relationship if the 
custodial parent ever moved from Summit County. H at 727. 
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The lower court in the present case was faced with a similar issue. Contrary to the 
Larson case, in the present case at the trial level, Father did not request custody of the 
children and simply requested that Mother be restrained from moving. For the first time 
now at the appellate level, Father has argued in his Brief that Mother could move, but the 
trial court should then simply transfer custody to him, regardless of the two-step Hogge 
test and the children's best interests irrespective of the fact that he has filed no petition or 
motion for custody. (See Note 3 above). In light of the facts of this case, the lower court 
herein did not abuse its discretion in maintaining the very important continuity of the 
custodial relationship between the children and Mother. See Larson. 888 P.2d at 722, 23; 
Hirsch v. Hirsch. 725 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J. Concurring); 
Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982); Nielsen v. Nielsen. 620 P.2d 511, 
512 (Utah 1980); In re Cooper. 410 P.2d 475, 476 (Utah 1966); In re Application of 
Conde. 347 P.2d 859, 861 (Utah 1959); Rosendahl v. RosendahL 876 P.2d 870, 873 
(Utah App.) cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Cummings v. Cummings. 821 P.2d 
472, 478-79 (Utah App. 1991); Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah App. 1990). 
A similar case, with similar reasoning to the Larson decision, is In Re: Marriage of 
Burgess. 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). In Burgess, the court overruled the California Court 
of Appeals decision that the relocating parent had the burden of establishing the 
"necessity" of the relocation. 14. at 479. The Supreme Court of California declined to 
impose a burden on a relocating parent to establish the necessity for the move and 
reiterated the paramount importance of continuity of custody over continuity of location 
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and made note that in a "move away" case, a change of custody is not justified simply 
because the custodial parent has chosen to reside in a different location. Id at 484. The 
court cited statistics that 20% of Americans change residences each year, usually for 
economic or marital reasons. Id at 480. In addition, the court, in discussing custody and 
relocation, noted that "relocating frequently has little, if any, substantive bearing on the 
suitability of a parent to retain the role of a custodial parent. A parent who has been the 
primaiy caregiver for minor children is ordinarily no less capable of maintaining the 
responsibilities and obligations of parenting simply by virtue of a reasonable decision to 
change his or her geographic location." id at 481. 
In addition to the Myers and Larson cases discussed above, Father relies on two 
articles to support his contention that the lower court abused its discretion by maintaining 
the custodial relationship and allowing Mother's relocation to Nevada. The first article 
cited by Father is "A Children's Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best 
Interests Standard" by Gary A. Debele. Journal of the American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers. Vol. 15, 1998, pp. 75-118. Mr. Debele's article is specifically 
concerned with the issue of the child's rights during a relocation proceeding. Mr. Debele 
states that "[t]he best interests of the child cannot be effected without a consideration of 
the child's feelings." I i at 106. As applied to the facts of the present case, Dr. Sanders 
found that the children both expressed their desire to continue to reside with Mother and 
had a strong attachment to Mother, and Kelsey "cited a number of positive factors 
associated with the move." 
2 1 
Mr. Debele goes on to state that "[w]hen courts intervene in ways that disrupt the 
child's relationship with the custodial parent, serious psychological harm may occur to 
the child as well as to the parent." Id at 108. As applied to the facts of this case, the 
lower court's action herein maintained and supported the children's relationship with the 
custodial parent, Mother. In addition, Mr. Debele also cites psychological studies and 
articles which state that: 
"The cumulative body of social science research on custody does not 
support the presumption that frequent and continuing access to both parents 
lies at the core of the child's best interests. While the psychological 
adjustment of the custodial parent has consistently been found to be related 
to the child's adjustment, that of the non-custodial parent has not. Neither 
is the amount of visiting of the non-custodial parent consistently related to 
the child's adjustment. There is no evidence that frequency of visiting or 
amount of time spent with the non-custodial parent over the child's entire 
growing up years is significantly related to good outcome in the child or 
adolescent. Rather, research indicates that it is the substance and character 
of the parent/child relationship, and not the particular form, that is critical." 
H at 109. 
In further discussing the psychological effects a relocation can have on the children and 
parents, Mr. Debele states that "[prohibiting a move by the custodial parent may force 
that parent to choose between custody of his or her child and opportunities that may 
benefit the family unit. Imposing this choice . . . has the potential of burdening the 
parent/child relationship for many years . . . [t]he child's knowledge that he or she has 
been the cause of the parent's profound disappointment and losing a central goal in life 
can be a terrible burden for the child to bear." Id, at 110. 
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The second article cited by Father is 'The Psychological Effects of Relocation for 
Children of Divorce," by Marion G. Gindes, Ph. D. Journal of the American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers, Vol. 15, 1998, pp. 119-148). Dr. Gindes discusses the impact on 
children and parents during a post-divorce relocation of the custodial parent. While Dr. 
Gindes does discuss the possibility of stress and trauma caused by a relocation, Dr. 
Gindes agrees with Mr. Debele and acknowledges that the factors which have been 
consistently related to positive child adjustment are (1) positive custodial parent 
adjustment, (2) positive relationship between custodial parent and child, and (3) low level 
of conflict between parents. Id at 144-45. Dr. Gindes also acknowledges the studies that 
show that "[frequency of contact with the noncustodial parent does not seem to be 
related to child well-being but the nature of the contact does." Id at 145. As applied to 
the facts of the present case, the trial court's order denying Father's request to restrain 
Mother from relocating will promote the custodial relationship between Mother and the 
children and lower the level of conflict between the parents. 
Based upon the enormous body of case law and the psychological studies as 
applied to the evidence and facts of this case, maintaining the custodial relationship 
between Mother and the children is the most important factor in determining what is in 
the best interests of these children and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Father's request to restrain Mother from moving to Nevada. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT IT DID NOT 
HAVE THE POWER TO PREVENT RELOCATION OR MODIFY 
CUSTODY UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
Father argues that under the Myers and Larson rulings of this Court, the trial court 
had the power to prohibit the relocation of Mother. Father bases this interpretation of 
these decisions on the fact that in each case this Court addressed the best interests of the 
children prior to affirming the lower court in allowing relocation, and overruling the 
lower court where it conditioned a relocation on a change in custody. Specifically, Father 
argues that "[i]f no power to permit evaluation of a relocation decision existed, there 
would have been no need for this section of the opinion," referring to the section of the 
opinion which discussed the best interests of the children. (Aplt. Brf. pg 14). However, 
in each of these cases, there was a petition to modify custody in addition to the relocation 
issues. When faced with a request for a modification of physical custody, it is black 
letter law4 that the trial court must make a determination of what is in the best interests of 
the children. At the trial level herein, Father did not seek custody of the children, only 
restraint of Mother from relocating. 
Father also cites Section 30-3-10.4(l)(b) of the Utah Code to support his allegation 
that the trial court could have prevented Mother's relocation. However, the provision 
Father cites to states in relevant part: 
4
 Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code states that "[i]n determining custody, the court 
shall consider the best interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral 
standards of each of the parties." 
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"On the motion of one or both of the joint legal custodians the court may, 
after a hearing, modify an order establishing joint legal custody i f . . . a 
modification of the terms and conditions of the decree would be an 
improvement for and in the best interest of the child." (emphasis added). 
However, the issue here is relocation. This appeal is not concerned with the modification 
of the joint legal custody order. This argument is nonsensical. 
Father also cites Section 30-3-5(3) of the Utah Code to support his position that 
the trial court could have prevented Mother's relocation. However, this provision states, 
in its entirety: 
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new 
orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary." (emphasis added). 
Again, here the issue is relocation, not custody. Mother does not dispute that the trial 
court has continuing jurisdiction to modify custody, but only after the two-part Hogge test 
is established,5 and then only after the determination that the change in custody is in the 
children's best interests, a finding which the neither the lower court nor Dr. Sanders 
made. Father's attempt to circumvent the statutory and case law requirements for a 
change in physical custody is without merit. 
Father is arguing that the trial court had discretion to change custody without a 
pending petition to modify custody, or a finding of a substantial and material change in 
5
 (1) Since the time of the previous decree, circumstances upon the which the earlier 
award was based have changed; and (2) these changed circumstances are sufficiently 
substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody. (See Note 3 above). 
25 
circumstances, or a finding that such a custodial change was in the best interests of the 
children. This position is in clear violation of the statutory law and the case law of this 
Court and the Supreme Court of Utah. Alternatively, Father argues that the trial court 
had the discretion to order that Mother never leave the geographic area, or if she does, 
she would lose custody of the children, again without any evidence or finding that such a 
change was in the children's best interests, again in violation of the statutory law and case 
law. While the trial court clearly has continuing jurisdiction to modify custodial 
arrangements, such a modification still must comply with the statutory requirements, and 
the requirements as stated by the appellate courts of Utah. 
Furthermore, if Father's argument is interpreted to state that, under the cited 
statutes, the trial court could modify the previous order to restrain Mother from ever 
relocating as long as the children were minors, such a determination would violate a 
number of Mother's constitutional rights under both the Utah Constitution and the 
Constitution of the United States of America.6 
While this issue has not yet been addressed in Utah, some other jurisdictions have 
addressed the constitutional issues in relocation cases. In New Mexico, the preeminent 
case is Jaramillo v. Jaramillo. in which the State Supreme Court of New Mexico stated 
that placing a burden on the relocating parent to show that relocation is in the best interest 
6
 Father seems to acknowledge at least one of Mother's constitutional rights on page 
16 of his Brief by stating that she could move and the children could stay, however, this 
again would require a change in custody which was neither supported by any evidence at the 
lower level, nor did Father even request custody at the lower level. 
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of the child impairs the relocating parent's constitutional right to travel. 823 P.2d 299 
(N.M. 1991). In that case, the mother had primary physical custody in a joint custody 
decree. The court stated that placing the burden on the party seeking to relocate to show 
that the relocation is in the best interests of the child unconstitutionally impairs the 
relocating parent's right to travel. Id at 305 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618, 
629-31 (1969)7; see also Watt v. Watt. 971 P.2d 608 (Wy. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that a 
clause automatically transferring custody to the father because the mother wanted to 
move from the State was violative of the right to travel)). The court indicated that there 
are personal rights which a parent has that protects them from governmental infringement, 
which includes the custodial parent's right to have the children move with that parent. 
The relocating custodial parent in Jaramillo argued that placing the burden on the 
relocating parent to prove that the relocation is in the best interests of the child impairs 
the relocating parent's right to travel. Id at 304. The Supreme Court of New Mexico 
agreed and remanded the case to the trial court to reinstate its order allowing the custodial 
parent to relocate with the child. 
In the Watt case cited above, the mother was awarded the primary physical 
custody of the parties' minor children by the decree, which also allowed for the automatic 
7
 Stating that "[e]ven before the ratification of the Constitution of the United States, 
the Articles of Confederation provided that 'the people of each State shall have free ingress 
and egress to and from any other state . . . .' This principle encompasses the right of 
individuals 'to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a new life . . . . ' " 394 U.S. at 629 
(quoting Articles of Confederation, Art. IV, §1 (1777). 
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transfer of custody to the father in the event that the mother moved more than 50 miles 
from the parties' hometown. 971 P.2d 608. When the mother sought to modify the 
decree so that she could relocate, the father objected and sought custody. The trial court 
awarded custody to the father. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the decision based 
upon the mother's constitutional right to travel. Id at 612 (citing Shapiro. 395 U.S. at 
629). The Wyoming Supreme Court went on to say that a citizen has the right to travel, 
and this right includes the right of a custodial parent to have the children move with that 
parent, and therefore, the mother was allowed to have her minor children join her in her 
new community. Id. at 616. 
Father's apparent argument that, under the cited statutes, the trial court could 
modify the previous order to restrain Mother from ever relocating as long as the children 
were minors, is without merit as such an order would clearly violate Mother's 
constitutional rights under both the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United 
States of America 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Mother respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
the lower court's denial of the Father's request to restrain the Mother from relocating to 
Nevada with the children and for an award of costs pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Mother respectfully requests that this Court award her attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in Father's appeal from this order, which order arose from a 
hearing on the lower court's law and motion calendar. 
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Respectfully submitted this / jJ^ftgfof July, 2000. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C. 
ILLIE F. WfLLIAMS I 
Attorney for Appellee/Mother 
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